

1 The Argument

This thesis is built around the idea that God is made known by the creation. 'The invisible things of God are visible, being understood by the things that are made.' So said St Paul in Romans 1:20. This means that what is not seen can be seen by an understanding that comes from a study of what has been created. This implies that we can have the idea of God and find evidence for that idea in the study of what is around us. This also implies that the idea of God will be consistent with what we know and that what we know is a fitting way to correctly describe God. I want to examine this possibility by looking at some features of mathematics. Mathematics is one of the best ways we have of understanding nature and the way it behaves. In the quote from St Paul, we see things by understanding them, and mathematics gives us understanding of how things relate in the actual world.

I claim that the idea of God is consistent with mathematical thinking. There are many ideas of God, so I will use the idea of God expressed by Anselm when he claimed that 'God is that than which nothing greater can be thought'. I will call this Anselm's Definition. Consistency is a technical term in Logic, so I will explain my use of the term. By consistent I will mean that the idea of God (as expressed in Anselm's Definition) can be expressed in mathematical language and that it is able to cohere with the implications of mathematical findings. This argument that Anselm's Definition can be mathematically understood will be placed in the context of a theory of knowing based on a theory of creation; that reality is mathematical

because God created it that way. This involves me in three key ideas which are the three themes of this thesis, namely, God and Mathematics, Anselm's Definition and Ontological Argument, and a Theory of Creation.

1.1 The Three Themes of the Thesis

Theme A. God and Mathematics. I hold a realist position, whereby I claim that what is, exists independently of my perceptions because it has been created by God. The mathematics we understand is inherent in the creation and not superimposed on it by own perceiving of it. We invent mathematical (and other) languages to express the inherent ability of the creation to be conceptually manipulated. It is my claim that, if God created the creation (reality), then God can be known by the creation and hence by mathematical thinking. The idea of God should cohere with mathematical ideas and be amenable to mathematical findings. Using Anselm's Definition as my idea of God, I will attempt to show how various mathematical structures can be related to Anselm's Definition and hence to the idea of God. The mathematical areas that I have chosen are Set theory (chapter 7), Infinity (chapter 8), Computability (chapter 9), Diagonalization (chapter 10), Incompleteness (chapter 11), Paradox (chapter 12) and Complexity (chapter 13).

Theme B. Anselm's Definition and Ontological Argument. If I am using Anselm's Definition I need to explain its origin and the way Anselm argued for it (chapters 3, 4). This will involve a discussion of ontological argument (chapter 2) and its relation to creation thinking. I maintain that the

creation is ex nihilo so what exists does not result from preconceived concepts or Forms. That is, reality is not theory driven. What exists is the result of divine fiat. I also examine theories of existence presented by Kant and Frege (chapter 6).

Theme C. A Theory of Creation. Mathematics is relevant to the creation because God has created a mathematically understandable creation. Reality is not the creation of mathematics but is correctly understood by means of mathematics. Creation is described as ex nihilo, spoken and finished (chapter 1). The conceptual nature of the creation can point to the idea of God (chapter 14). The aseity of God says that God is not bound by a nature or what God creates (chapter 15). Comments about God and creation occur throughout the thesis.

1.2 Two Approaches

There are two approaches that I want to consider in handling the challenge of ontological argument. The first approach is as follows.

Approach 1

1. Mathematical entities are discovered a priori.
2. A standard way to make these discoveries is by completing the system. For instance, the building up of the number systems $\text{integers} \subset \text{rationals} \subset \text{reals} \subset \text{complex numbers}$.
3. Applying this method to metaphysics suggests that there is a maximal being.
4. Further argument posits an abstract maximal being.

5. Further argument posits a unique abstract maximal being.
The final 'ontic' step is

6. This unique, abstract, maximal being exists.

This may be described as a traditional ontological argument. I think that steps 1. to 5. are not problematic. Someone may not agree with the direction of the argument but, at least, they may well permit the argument without major offense. However, the final 'ontic' step is the problem. Such a being is conceivable but that does not mean that it exists. There is an attractive way to argue here by claiming that the concept of such a being implies its own existence. Hintikka (Hintikka (1986)) explains the attractiveness and subtlety of this kind of argument by describing what he calls an operator-switch fallacy. He considers the sentence $N(\exists x)[(y)(y \text{ exists} \supset x \text{ exists})]$ where N is the necessity operator. Using possible-worlds semantics he explains this formula as meaning 'that in each world there is something such that if anything exists in that world then it does' (ibid., p251). He then considers another sentence $(\exists x)N[(y)(y \text{ exists} \supset x \text{ exists})]$ with a replacement of the operator N. This says that there is something that if anything exists then it necessarily exists. This latter statement is, according to Hintikka, a form of the ontological argument. To Hintikka, the first formula is plausible, the second one is not. I think that there is a problem with ontological thinking (essence implies existence) and the manner in which existence is obtained for the concept of a maximal being.

Approach 2

In this approach, we start with the idea of God and show

ways by which that idea can be made plausible and consistent with attained knowledge. The existence of God (or maximal being) is assumed as an event that is indicated not proven. As I hope to show below, this makes God the source of the conceptual not the product of it. This approach is as follows.

1. God is the Creator and pure existent. That is, God can be said to exist without saying anything else about God.
2. God creates the creation, which consists of physical objects and the relations between them. God's creation is *ex nihilo*, spoken and finished.
3. Language is a feature of the spoken creation. Language is the basis and mechanism for the conceivability of the creation.
4. Knowledge is accumulated by language ranging over the objects and relations of the creation.
5. God, the pure existent, is conceivable and describable by means of language and the knowledge gained from the creation.
6. That is, the invisible things of God are visible, being understood by the things that are made.

This is the approach that I will be taking in this thesis. The key question in these approaches is when is existence introduced into the argument? In approach 1 existence can be left to the last (ontic) step, based, for instance, on the necessary existence of perfection or maximal being. Anselm introduces existence earlier by arguing that existence of the idea of God in the mind leads to existence of God in reality (which is greater). I am placing existence at the start of the argument, by assuming the

existence of God as Creator and by further argument (below) that actual existence is the arbitrary choice of a Creator God. This means that actual existence is not theory driven but that it can be theory indicated. Or as Quine says 'physical objects, if they did not exist, would have to be invented. They are indispensable as the public common denominators of private sense experience.' (Quine (1982), p1). This 'ontic' necessity is not creational because it claims that what exists is a necessity of thought rather than a creative act of God. However, theory can indicate existence.

1.3 Clarifying Terminology of a Theory of Creation

I need to start with the idea of God. I will be looking for evidence for the existence of God in terms of assumptions I make about our understanding of God. So I will give an account of what I think God has done in the creation and see what evidence there is in mathematics for what I claim to have happened.

The idea I have of God will be embedded in the idea of creation. There are three key ideas that I will use. These are God, creation and language. I will explain these as follows.

God is the Creator of the creation.

God is the Maximal Being. Using Anselm's Definition, that 'God is that than which nothing greater can be thought', we can say that God is that than which nothing greater can be said. Anything that we can say about God can be at the limit of our conceptual capacity. If we regard language about God as being of greater and greater complexity and

significance, then whatever thought we have about God can still be a greater thought. Two considerations arise here. Does all thought about God have to be sequential and bound by a limit? And what is meant by a 'greater thought'? These will be discussed at greater length, but initial responses are as follows. The answer to the first question (about the sequential nature of thought about God) is 'no'. We can make statements about God which describe God, for instance, as good, true and right. Whatever may be our understanding of true, to say that God is true means that God is not false. It is difficult to get gradations of 'true'. Either God is true or God is not. Similarly, God is good not evil and right and not wrong. Gradations may occur if we see God relevant to more and more situations, so that God's goodness and rightness is seen as ultimately universal and applicable in all conceivable situations. For the second question, (I will later describe the possible meaning of greater and greater beauty) I claim that a possible gradation is how goodness and rightness may be quantified by being seen to be more and more relevant to more and more situations. Anselm's Definition has the advantage of being a method or algorithm and so it does not rely on giving examples of attributes. It is a generalized formula that prescribes a way of thinking to which each thinker brings their own thought. So God, as Maximal Being, is that object understood by thought, where all possible attributes or descriptors of God can be considered. Is God the only object of maximal thought? Is there a maximal being of evil? One answer is that good is greater than evil and God as the 'greater than' has no evil. A maximal evil being would have characteristics that are logically anti-

God features such as chaos, destructiveness and wretchedness. There is an integrity and 'compactness' associated with the attributes of God because such features are God features. That is how we describe God. To give a maximal evil being God features, such as greatest power or greatest wisdom, would be using God features to describe what is not God. Can I use God descriptors and end up with not-God? If I use only God descriptors I can only end up with the concept of God. That is the being that I am describing. If words hold their meaning, then I must obtain the concept the words indicate. Having the concept of maximal being does not give me the existence of the maximal being (that is ontological thinking, essence implies existence). But if I have the concept of God as maximal being, I should be able to claim that God is what I am talking about and not something else. Maximal being sounds an uncommitted term, but if we have the due process of running along all attributes of God to their maximal extent and across all God attributes for their maximal coverage, then it is the concept of God that we end up with. If it is not, then it is God by another name. This is similar to arguments for uniqueness in mathematics. (If $a+b = a+c$ then $b=c$.) Say, for instance, that there is a maximal evil being who has all the attributes of God except it is evil instead of good. Reverting to the technique of Anselm's Definition, we can make good greater than evil and obtain the required concept of God. If evil is greater than good then God is evil. But this is a misunderstanding of the use of the word 'evil'. Also if we pursue the implications of the word 'evil' we come up with other anti-God descriptors which conflict with our concept of God.

I should emphasise at this point the particular feature of Anselm's Definition, which is that it is attribute free. As I have said, Anselm's Definition can be regarded as an algorithm or method that does not have a specific content in its exercise. This means that we are speaking about the Maximal Being, which is the being arrived at by purely formal means. To get a maximal evil being we have to qualify the sense of being intended as evil. There may well be a conceivable maximal evil being but such a being is not the maximal formal being. We may use other qualifications such as maximal beauty being or maximal happy being, but these are all qualifications of the idea of a maximal being. Anselm's Definition gives us the unqualified maximal being which, using Anselm's greater than argument, gives us the maximal being greater than any other conceivable being.

1.4 The creation

God is the Creator responsible for the creation. The creation consists of all that is actual and existent (except God). There are three things that I want to say about the creation. The first is creation is ex nihilo. The second is that God speaks the creation. The third is that the creation is finished. I will consider these in turn.

1. The creation is ex nihilo.

I take this to mean that nothing existed (other than God) prior to the creation. When God creates, God creates out of nothing. There is no primal substance, no conceptual or eternal Platonic Forms. There is no universal of which the creation is an instantiation. This may become a way of viewing the creation once it is created, but it is not the

way the creation was created. This also implies that existence (or what exists) is not theory driven; that which exists is not conforming to some theory which also binds God as the Creator. It may be argued that the theory is in the mind of God before God creates, similar to the idea that Augustine relocated the eternal Platonic Forms in the Mind of God. However, I wish to maintain that existence is arbitrary and depends entirely on the creative choice of God, expressed only and understood only in the creative act. God is not even adhering to God's own theory. If there is a pattern to the creation (and we recognise various patterns in the creation) the first evidence of pattern is at the creation. This means that the creation does not have to be a certain way. It is a certain way by creative choice of the Creator, which is not evident before the creation. This also means that what exists is not an outcome that is necessary to a theory or an attribute. Something may exist, but its existence is necessary only because God speaks it into existence by divine fiat. Nevertheless, existence may be pointed to by a theory. Once we have the creation, theory and knowledge can be gained. Then theory can tell us where to look for a possible existent. This is one of the major points of the thesis: mathematical theory can indicate possible existence. I argue that the idea of God is consistent (as previously defined) with known findings in mathematics and logic. But theory does not determine existence. Only the creative act of God determines what exists. The creative act of God is arbitrary to, and entirely dependent upon, the creative will of God and not upon a preconceived theory or nature.

2. God speaks the creation.

God speaks the creation into existence. I take this to mean that the creation is essentially linguistic: it can be spoken about and manipulated by concepts. Traditionally, in Greek thought the Logos (the Word) is the basis of what is rational. That which can be rendered in words is conceivable and able to be manipulated by language. God can maintain the creation by God's words. This also means that words can be associated with objects and the relations between them. The creation is basically rational, linguistic, manipulable, stable, intelligible, logical and able to be spoken about.

3. The creation is finished.

Presumably, the creation is constructed in some sense. The actual creation consists of physical objects and relations between them. Objects can be discerned from other objects. Objects, if not created in a sequence, can be placed in a sequence and presumably in a 1-1 correspondence with the natural numbers. Using the Identity of Indiscernibles (Leibniz), I maintain that objects can be isolated and counted. But how many objects are there? An infinite sequence (of natural numbers) is a sequence in which there is always another term (number). This is the experience from within the sequence. Outside the sequence the sequence may be regarded as completed (an actual infinity). From within the sequence the sequence is a potential infinity; that is, there is always another term (or successor number). I claim that not even God can complete a sequence that, by definition, cannot be completed. Therefore the

physical creation is not infinite. There may be a lot of discernible objects (say 10^{30}) but this is still a finite number. In this account infinity is conceivable and conceptually managed, because creation is completed.

By means of the creation specific physical objects exist. One object can be distinguished from another. Objects are in relations with each other. A is bigger than B, A is to the left of B, etc., are examples of relations. Relations exist because objects exist. But there are no relations without objects and there are no objects without relations.

In this account of creation it is important to see that the spoken creation implies that the creation is conceptually complete at creation. At creation God creates the mental and the physical functions of that creation. The mental represents what is conceptual and the physical represents what is actual. Both are real aspects of the creation. The mental aspect is closed and created. 'Closed' here means the result of mental activity is always another thought. Does the creation have a mind? The answer is no, but the creation can be (and is intended to be) the object of mental activity. Does God have a mind? God is not dictated to by Mind or eternal conceptual Forms. If God has a mind it is something that God creates for God's use. God has the freedom to conceive without the structure of a mind, even as God has the freedom to choose without the structure of a nature. This is the aseity of God.

In any discussion of conceptual completeness, such as a conceptually close creation, there is the consideration of semantic incompleteness. Following Tarski, we cannot have a

conceptual system that can make all its own truth claims. There is always a truth beyond the system. This will be discussed later.

The actual is what is created and is usually seen as the physical. Lewis in 'Anselm and Actuality' (Lewis (1970)) treats the actual as an indexical which has the effect of relativizing possible worlds. In this article Lewis re-works interpretations of the ontological argument accepting a best interpretation that includes 'the exceeding greatness of x in the actual world' (ibid., p179). On the one hand he says that 'we know in some utterly mysterious way that we are actual' (ibid., p186), and on the other hand he treats the actual as an indexical and relative to a particular world. To Lewis there is nothing special about the actual world. It is simply where the ontological arguer resides. Therefore, the ontological argument collapses for Lewis because he dissolves the certitude of the actual. I argue that the idea of the creation means that the actual world is the created world.

1.5 Language and Ontological Argument

I have maintained that the creation is spoken into existence by God. This implies that words and generally, language are capable of manipulating the actual creation. Language is the mechanism for thought. Thought is that which is conceivable or expressible in a language. It would appear that there are many different languages and agents of language such as machine, human, extraterrestrial and divine. The conceivability of the creation is the ability to express what actually exists, in a language. Ideas and

concepts exist in the language. This is not actual existence, which is a property of the physical only. This is something as a conceivable existent. That is, something can be thought to exist. Such an object may be describable, distinguishable from other objects and intelligible but not actual. The conceptual is based on and expressed by the creation, namely the objects and the relations between them. Both the content of and the capacity for language are based upon the creation. It is language about the creation that creates knowledge. With this knowledge we have an understanding of God. So God creates the possibility of knowledge about God by means of the creation.

What is the relation between thought and existence, which is raised by ontological argument? Thought is based on relations and existence is based on physical objects. Relations exist between objects. Thought objectifies relations by means of words. Relations, isolated by thought, can be considered between variable objects. Logic has the concept of the propositional function, where a property or predicate P (a 1-place relation) describes a set of objects (the domain), where each object of the domain gives a value to the variable x , as in $P(x)$, producing a true proposition.

The relation between thought and existence is the basis of ontological argument. Ontological argument makes a link between thought and existence by attempting to determine what exists by thought. The empiricist, who maintains that all knowledge is obtained from objects (by the senses), does not allow for thought being able to determine what exists, even though thought is in association with what

exists. Such an empiricist as Schlick maintained that there was no factual a priori and that the synthetic a priori was an impossibility (Feigl (1949), p 281). It is my argument in this thesis that thought can only indicate existence. So there is a link between thought and existence, because thought is about what is the case and what has been created. There is a link between the Humean relations-of-ideas and matters-of-fact. This relation can be seen in the fact that thought can prove what is contradictory, which cannot exist. Generally we may say that concepts (or words) are universals such as properties, and particulars (which are instances of universals) are the created objects. Language becomes the conceptual means by which we understand and conceptualize the creation, which is ultimately how we relate to and understand God. A language-based creation means that language, ranging over the creation, makes knowledge possible. Language agents, such as people, are also part of the creation. It is part of human functioning to use language. This means the language user moves by means of language from the particular existent to the universal idea or property, from the perception to the concept. Mathematics becomes one of the main ways by which we conceptualize and manipulate our environment. I look for ways by which mathematics (as knowledge) can say something about God. But how can this be? Mathematics, in any usual understanding and use, is not about God. People do not usually learn mathematics to learn about God. However, mathematics provides a collection of ways of formal thinking and arguing that can be used in clarifying ideas about God. The idea of God is an interpretation of this formal reasoning. In this thesis I

argue that in such areas as Set Theory, Computability, and Logic, we can find ways of thinking that are consistent with and cohere in the idea of God. Does this prove the existence of God? I do not think so and I do not think that I can prove existence, a priori. Existence is not theory driven. What actually exists is not determined by theory, neither at the original creation nor by the abstract use of concepts in language now. I do not relocate theory in God's mind. God may have a mind but God is not dictated to by a mind or a nature, as though there were things by which God was bound.

Anselm's Definition is an example of thought in search of what may exist, in this case, the existence of God. Anselm feels that he can make the jump from existence in the mind to existence in reality, which is greater. Thought, expressed through language, is the main indicator that we have of the way things are or may be. The fact that the creation can be correctly understood and manipulated by language indicates the stability and rationality of the creation. Where does this rationality come from? Does the mind superimpose it's a priori standards on reality as perceived or is the rationality in the creation itself, independently of the mind? I claim that the rationality is in the creation itself. If I only see what my mind allows me to see, how then can I be corrected by what I see? If my mind creates my environment why is there anything out there to correct my self-engineered perceptions? If reality is a private creation why is there so much agreement on what is out there? Can so many private agendas agree on what is out there purely on the basis of social need?

1.6 Mathematics and Language

Mathematics is an example of the derivation of ideas for handling reality. We may say that reality is mathematical and that reality behaves in a mathematical way. Are mathematical ideas derived from reality (inductively) or are they expressible with respect to reality (deductively)? I argue that mathematical ideas are associated with the perception of relations between created and physical objects, that they are objectified by language and can be used, in turn, to analyse reality. This is because reality is analyzable as created. Mathematics is a mirror to reality. This suggests that the creation is conceivable as a creation as well as being a physical creation. One does not get a thought from a physical object. One gets a thought about a physical object. What is actually thought can be embellished and expanded by language in the realm of the conceivable creating a 'conceivable creation'. The conceivable creation abides in language and is a way of living with the actual creation. It is not prior to the actual creation because the actual creation is ex nihilo. So mathematics is a way to explore, conceptually, the creation. Mathematics expresses the extent of the creation. Mathematics expresses the conceivability of the creation.

Three things are being said here, a. Mathematics is present with the physical creation, (which consists of objects and relations) as spoken by God. b. The mathematics is reified in a language, mathematical concepts and techniques are developed and mathematics is developed as a purely a prior science. c. These mathematical techniques are used to explore, and express the nature of, the physical world.

This means that mathematics tells us how the natural world (the physical creation) is. Is the mathematics 'present with' or 'derived from' the spoken creation? I will say 'present with' as the mathematics is seen in the conceivability of what is made. If it is 'derived from' then we have a rationality prior to the mathematics that creates the mathematics, making the mathematics conceptual and superimposed and not inherent and observed. I want to avoid a prior rationalism (or Form) driving what exists, or even the ability to understand what exists. God alone is the force for meaning, not Mind (in or outside God) or human invention. The religious claim is made that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. This is seeing with the eye of reason. If mathematics is about the physical creation and the physical creation can tell us about God, then mathematics can presumably tell us something about God. Are there patterns of mathematical thought that are consistent with the idea of God? In mathematics one can have results or findings as distinct from speculations. The Incompleteness results of Gödel place genuine limitations on speculation. Also the results on semantic incompleteness of Tarski are relevant (to be discussed in chapter 11). Can these findings be used to confirm a belief in God?

1.7 Language and God

I am saying that because God speaks the creation the creation is inherently linguistic. That is, we can use language to understand and manipulate the creation, or what is the case. God, as the unqualified maximal being, is now able to be described by the language and knowledge gained

from the creation. So the creation becomes a way to know and understand God. By language, the creation equips us to describe God. Is this description a correct description? How do we know that God is conceivable and able to be correctly described by language? Firstly, I would claim that what exists is conceivable. Not all that is conceivable exists (to our knowledge) and that which is contradictory cannot exist. That which is inconceivable cannot be described and cannot be known to exist. How do you describe the inconceivable to be able to claim that it exists? What is the inconceivable that it can exist? Before the creation, God is not describable because there is no creation, or knowledge by language to describe God. But God is conceivable as pure existent. Existence is the one thing by which we can describe the Creator before the creation. The inconceivable has no definition at all. Even to say that the inconceivable exists is a form of definition and description. The inconceivable cannot be part of the creation because the creation is by articulation by God. I am claiming that God speaks the creation. This must mean that the inconceivable, if it exists, is a rival to God, without creation and beginning. This means that God is not God and that there is a source of being or existence beyond God. If the inconceivable exists it is not part of the creation and therefore is prior to the creation and indeed prior to any conceivable creation let alone the creation that we are a part of. The inconceivable then becomes an indefinable existent rivaling God. Creation, when it occurs, can do nothing to define the inconceivable. God can be conceived to exist and behave as the Creator, being understood by means of the creation.

Nothing, by definition, can be said about the inconceivable. That which exists must be something. We cannot simply attach existence to some concept and claim that it exists. Again we may argue that a predicate requires an instance else the domain of the predicate is empty. Is the inconceivable a member of any domain? I would say not; which is simply another way of saying that the inconceivable has no predicates or is indescribable. There is no evidence for the inconceivable because any evidence would be a description of what cannot be described.

1.8 A Warning

I am aware that talk about God can be cheap. I can start seeing God behind every analogy to such an extent that to see God everywhere is to see God nowhere. I can also use God in the 'deus ex machina' sense that produces God to resolve any difficulty and justify any reference. Mathematics may be seen to refer to God but why should it? Mathematics is a way of thinking and turns out to be very relevant to the world (the creation). This relevance to the creation (see 'The Unreasonable Effectiveness of the Mathematics in the Natural Sciences' Wigner (1969)) strongly suggests (to the realist) an order and orderability inherent in the creation. I am making the basic claim that the way God behaves is understood by the things that are made. The idea is that the creation provides the knowledge and language by which we can, in turn, understand God as the Creator of the creation. Why should the conceivability of the creation (as seen in mathematics) make for the conceivability of God? One answer is to say 'try it and see if mathematics can make sense of

the idea of God'. Another answer is to say that what exists is conceivable and mathematics, as a language of conceivability, may be relevant. Another answer is to say that, even as God spoke the creation, now God speaks by means of the creation as well as maintaining the creation by God's word. Does a rational creation imply a rational Creator? I have argued that we can know nothing about the inconceivable. God, as the Creator, is conceivable and God speaks rationally in order to speak into being a rational creation. I have also argued against God having a specific nature to which God has to conform. Therefore God chooses to create a rational (conceivable) creation. If God chooses and speaks rationally, I conclude that God's behaviour is rational. God does not have to be rational; God chooses to be rational and to create an intelligible creation. If God chooses to be intelligible, then God is best known by an intelligible creation. If we have an intelligible (rational) creation then I conclude that most probably, God can be understood as rational. Could an irrational God be playing a rationality game? Can the irrational be rational? No, by definition. Can God be irrational and irrationally produce the rational? No, because the rational cannot be produced from the irrational. Can God sovereignly (God as God) be essentially irrational but present the idea of 'God' as rational and produce a rational creation? The problem here is implying that God has an irrational nature that is prior to God's rational creation. God is as God chooses and does not have a prior nature to conflict with God's choices. Is rationality a perception, which from another perspective, is irrational? The problem here is that 'rational' is losing its meaning. The experience of

the world is that it is stable and comprehensible, although not fully understood by us.

Whatever knowledge we have of God will be expressed in language and be conceivable and, presumably, intelligible. In whatever way God chooses to act, it has to be expressible in an intelligible way, if we are to know about it. However God chooses to act is how God chooses to act, for God is God. God is not conforming to a nature but God's behaviour is consistent in that God chooses to be, say merciful and loving. Behaviour is choice; nature is destiny. God is not dictated to by a pre-conceived nature beyond which God cannot go. Rather God sovereignly chooses to act as God does. Covenant is a choice not a nature.